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INTRODUCTION 
People often find themselves in situations where 
negotiation is necessary to resolve conflict. For example, 
people negotiate to determine salary increases, injury 
compensation, and even car prices. In this paper, I address 
the issue of whether people perceive differences in the 
procedural justice of different negotiating styles, in 
particular the 
individualism. 
styles of cooperation, competition and 
First, I begin by reviewing the literature relevant to 
the study of bargaining and bargaining styles. Second, I 
review the literature concerning procedural justice. 
Finally, I discuss the results and implications of the 
present study for the understanding of bargaining in 
general and 
particular. 
for perceptions of procedural justice in 
1 
REVIEW OF BARGAINING LITERATURE 
Bargaining, as defined in the literature, is the 
process whereby two or more parties attempt to settle 
what each shall give and take, or perform and receive, in a 
transaction between them. Five characteristics of bargain-
ing, as defined by Rubin and Brown (1975), are: (1) at least 
two parties are involved; (2) these parties have a conflict 
of interest with respect to one or more different issues; 
(3) regardless of the existence of prior experience with one 
another, the parties are at least temporarily joined in a 
voluntary relationship; (4) the activity in the relationship 
concerns (a) the resolution of one or more intangible issues 
among the parties and (b) the division or exchange of one or 
more specific resources; and (5) the activity usually 
involves the presentation of demands by one party, 
evaluation by the other, followed by concessions or 
counterproposals in a sequential rather than simultaneous 
activity. 
One major area of study in the bargaining literature 
has been the definition and effectiveness of different 
styles of bargaining. Research suggests that three primary 
styles exist: (1) competition, (2) cooperation, and (3) 
individualism (Deutsch, 1973; Rubin & Brown, 1975), These 
three styles refer most generally to one bargainer's 
2 
3 
·tudinal disposition toward another (Deutsch, 1960). 
at ti 
Bargainers with a competitive style have an interest in 
doing better than others while at the same time doing as 
well for themselves as possible. Bargainers have a 
cooperative style to the extent that they have a positive 
interest in others' welfare as well as their own welfare. 
Bargainers with an individualistic style are simply 
interested in maximizing their own outcomes, regardless of 
how others fare. Other bargaining styles can also exist, 
but these three styles represent extreme cases and have 
been the focus of much research. 
The question that follows, then, is which of these 
three bargaining styles is most effective in resolving 
conflict, allowing disputants to reach a satisfying 
conclusion with relative ease? Addressing this question, 
Rubin and Brown (1975) suggest that a cooperative style is 
more effective in delivering an acceptable outcome through 
bargaining than either an individualistic or especially a 
competitive style. Research has supported the importance of 
cooperation as an effective bargaining style using a variety 
of methods to manipulate bargaining styles, including: (1) 
varying experimental instructions, ( 2 ) premeasuring 
respondents' attitudes and (3) manipulating the payoff 
matrices. 
One popular method of manipulating bargaining styles, 
pioneered by Deutsch (1958, 1960), is varying experimental 
instructions. This is 
method of manipulating 
a relatively 
styles of 
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successful and simple 
bargaining. Inducing 
subjects in this way to bargain cooperatively has lead to 
greater bargaining effectiveness, allowing disputants to 
reach satisfying outcomes with relative ease, than inducing 
subjects to bargain competitively or individualistically 
(Rubin & Brown, 1975). 
Support for 
style also comes 
premeasurement of 
cooperation as 
from a second 
attitudes. 
an effective bargaining 
method of manipulation, 
Pretesting respondents' 
attitudes involves, in part, determining whether respondents 
have "own gain" (individualistic) or "relative gain" 
(competitive) goal orientations, on the basis of their 
performance on an initial series of "prisoner's dilemma" 
games. 
A third method of manipulating bargaining styles is to 
alter the possible outcomes available to each person in the 
bargaining 
possible 
interaction. 
outcomes, the 
By manipulating the 
degree of conflict 
pattern of 
can also be 
manipulated (Rubin & Brown, 1975). The pattern of possible 
outcomes, represented by the matrix below (see Figure 1), 
was developed from exchange theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). 
This matrix stresses the interdependence of behavior, 
displaying alternatives for outcomes in the bargaining 
interaction. 
In figure 1, the outcomes, represented by the letters 
Figure 1 
~atrix of Behavior Outcomes 
Behavior of Person 1 
Behavior of 
Person 2 
cooperative 
cooperative 
al 
a2 
competitive 
cl 
b2 
-------------------------------:----------------------
bl dl 
competitive c2 d2 
5 
6 
81 b, c, and d, refer to different consequences possible in 
the interaction. In this case, al refers to the 
consequences of the behavior of person 1, whereas a2 refers 
to the outcomes of the behavior of person 2. Respondents 
discovered these outcomes through interaction with each 
other. In a bargaining interaction, it may be that the 
consequences of mutual cooperation (represented here by the 
letter a) would yield a better outcome than mutual 
competition (represented here by the letter d). 
By increasing or decreasing the value of one or more 
of these four bargaining outcomes, researchers have varied 
the level of conflict (Aranoff & Tedeschi, 1968). 
Increasing certain values in the outcome matrix may increase 
conflict, which in turn can be expected to increase 
competitiveness. For instance, in the matrix below (see 
Figure 2) the values for c=40 and d=50 indicate that 
the reward for being competitive is greater than the reward 
for being cooperative. This pattern of outcome values may 
increase competitiveness. Increasing the reward for 
cooperation, thereby decreasing conflict, may lead in 
and a more contrast to more cooperative behavior 
satisfactory experience in bargaining. 
In the matrix below (see Figure 2), the reward for 
competition is greater than the reward for cooperation, 
increasing the level of conflict and competitiveness. It 
has been found, however, that as the level of conflict 
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Figure 2 
Matrix of Outcomes Leading to a Competitive Bargaining Style 
Behavior of 
Person 2 
cooperative 
Behavior of Person 1 
cooperative 
20 
20 
competitive 
40 
30 
-------------------------------:----------------------
30 50 
competitive 40 50 
8 
increases, the effectiveness of bargaining as a method of 
conflict resolution may decrease (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). 
Considered together, the research in this area suggests 
that, although bargaining may be ineffective in resolving 
cases of high conflict, in situations with at least moderate 
conflict bargaining may be an effective method of conflict 
resolution. In these cases, a cooperative bargaining style 
would lead to more effective conflict resolution than an 
individualistic or competitive bargaining style. 
Bargaining research has also explored the important 
strategic issue of the effects of early cooperative or 
competitive overtures on the course of bargaining. The 
general conclusion of this research is that the early 
initiation of cooperative behavior tends to promote the 
development of trust and a mutually beneficial, cooperative 
relationship. Early competitive behavior, on the other 
hand, tends to induce mutual suspicion and competition 
(Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967; Rubin & Brown, 1975). 
In sum, these three methods of bargaining style 
manipulation (1) varying experimental instructions, (2) 
premeasuring respondents' attitudes and (3) manipulating the 
payoff matrices suggest that cooperative conflict 
resolution is most effective in negotiating a satisfying 
outcome. 
In explaining why cooperation may be a more effective 
bargaining style, Kelley and Stahelski (1970) found that 
9 
respondents who began with cooperative styles displayed 
greater variance in their expectations of how a typical 
person should behave than did competitive respondents, who 
expected a typical person to behave competitively, as they 
themselves behaved. This finding suggests that cooperators 
are more sensitive to the potential variability of other's 
behavior, more aware of the possibility of influence of the 
competitor, and better able to modify their perceptions (and 
presumably their behavior) accordingly. Apparently, the 
cooperative bargaining style increases the respondent's 
ability to adapt to the behavior of the other person and to 
change circumstances when necessary to increase the 
likelihood of reaching a satisfying outcome; 
RESEARCH ON PERCEIVED JUSTICE 
As discussed above, cooperation, competitive and 
individualism are three different bargaining styles that are 
defined in the literature as being 
in conflict resolution. Is 
differentially effective 
it also the case that 
participants in the bargaining process perceive these 
bargaining styles to be different in the degree of fairness 
of the bargaining procedures and/or the outcome? Previous 
researchers have explored the concept of justice within two 
domains: (1) procedural justice, the justice or fairness of 
the process through which an allocation decision is made 
(Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Thibaut & Walker, 1975); and 
(2) distributive justice, the justice or fairness of the way 
10 
in which the resources are allocated (Walster, Walster & 
Bersheid, 1978). 
In the study of procedural justice, two important 
perceptual models have been developed. The first model that 
I will discuss stems from the work of Thibaut and Walker 
(1975). The second model that I will discuss was developed 
from the work of Leventhal (1980). 
Thibaut and Walker's Model of Procedural Justice. 
One influential model of procedural justice follows 
from the work of Thibaut and Walker (1975), who defined the 
concept of justice as fairness. According to John Rawls 
(1971), justice as fairness is appropriate because it 
conveys the idea that participants agree to the principles 
of justice in an initial situation that is fair. The Oxford 
Dictionary also refers to justice and fairness as synonymous 
(Oxford Dictionary, 1980). 
In exploring the notion of procedural justice, 
Thibaut and Walker (1975) define conditions important in the 
determination of procedural justice. They differentiate two 
important aspects of procedural justice: (1) process 
control; and (2) decision control. First, I will describe 
process control, or the opportunity to present evidence. 
Second, I will describe decision control, or the opportunity 
to have influence over the final outcomes. 
Process Control. One important aspect of procedural 
justice is process control. Thibaut and Walker's model 
11 
(1975) examines both the decision maker's and the 
disputant's need for process control. In terms of conflicts 
of interest, the procedural system designed to achieve 
distributive justice attempts to evaluate the weight of the 
party's claim, and then render an allocation decision. The 
system will function most effectively in gaining information 
and evaluating the disputant's claim if process control is 
assigned to disputants. The disputants typically have m0re 
information than the third party information collect0r· and 
can better present the evidence. 
Another reason why the sy~~em will function most 
effectively if the disputants 
that the "actor-0~server bias" 
can exert process control is 
(Jones & Nisbett, 1972) may 
distort the 
behavior. 
third party's 
Specifically, 
perceptions of the disputants' 
Jones and Nisbett (1972) cite 
observers' tendency to attribute actors' behavior to stable 
dispositions, while the actors are more likely to attribute 
the cause of their behavior to situational factors. In this 
way, the third party information collector may be more 
likely to see the disputant's behavior 
some stable disposition rather than 
situational variables. 
as a reflection of 
as a result of 
Decision Control. Process control allows the 
disputants the 
reducing the 
opportunity to present their information, 
threat of "actor-observer bias." Decision 
control, Thibaut and Walker's second important aspect of 
12 
procedural justice, is allotted to a third party who 
makes the final decision, as in a legal situation, or to the 
disputants, as in a bargaining situation. In cases of 
intense conflict of interest, however, decision control 
should be assigned to a third party (Thibaut & Walker, 
1975). This implies that arbitration is the most just 
process for resolving high conflicts of interest (Thibaut 
& Walker, 1975) and supports the above claim that bargaining 
may not be effective in situations involving high conflicts 
of interest. 
Following from the research on aspects of process and 
outcome control, researchers have often compared conflict 
resolution methods, primarily focusing on the adversarial 
and inquisitorial approaches. Near one end of a continuum 
denoting process control of the decision maker is the 
adversarial model (see Figure 3). This model, most often 
used in American and British court systems, permits 
disputants in the conflict to exercise a great deal of 
control over the substance of the hearing, through the 
actions of their attorneys, whom the disputants have chosen 
to be responsible for advancing their interests. In the 
adversarial model, the role of the decision maker is 
essentially passive. It is the attorneys who investigate 
the case in conflict, and who control the flow of 
information to the decision maker in an effort to secure a 
decision favorable to the disputant with whom their outcomes 
13 
Figure 3 
Varying Degrees of Process Control of the Decision Maker 
(from Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, 1974) 
Degree of Process 
Control 
Method of Conflict 
Resolution 
LOW 1----------------bargaining 
2----------------adversarial model 
3----------------double investigator model 
4----------------single investigator model 
HIGH 5----------------inquisitorial model 
14 
are aligned. 
At the other end of the process control continuum is 
the inquisitorial model (see Figure 3). This model is 
characterized primarily by the fact that control over most 
of the substance lies in the hands of the decision makers, 
who are no longer passive players. The inquisitorial 
decision makers themselves accumulate information during the 
hearing through personal interrogation of the disputants and 
witnesses (Lind et al., 1978). 
The effectiveness of adversarial and inquisitorial 
models of conflict resolution has been explored in the 
early procedural justice literature by focusing on the 
fundamental dichotomy between the desired resolution 
objectives of truth and justice, as defined by Thibaut and 
Walker (1975). Conflicts about the most accurate view of 
reality, like scientific disputes, have as the object of the 
resolution the determination of truth. Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) suggest that for these 
inquisitorial model is perceived 
just. In these disputes, the 
primarily objective facts, weigh 
cognitive conflicts, the 
by the disputants as most 
decision makers accumulate 
the evidence and make the 
necessary decision. The accumulation of objective facts 
leaves little room for decision maker bias which may lead to 
distortions in decision making. 
When the conflict is about apportionment of outcomes, 
however, such as conflicts of interest, the best resolution 
is one aiming toward distributive justice. 
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Thibaut and 
Walker suggest that 
adversarial model is 
for these conflicts of interest, the 
most likely to reach satisfactory 
results. The goal of conflicts of interest is distributive 
justice -- a fair outcome. Information collected in search 
of a fair outcome may be primarily subjective information, 
not objective facts. This leaves more room for decision 
maker bias to be present in the decision making process. 
The adversarial model reduces the possibility of decision 
making bias by allowing each party the opportunity to 
present their own case. Research has shown that the 
adversarial model is perceived by potential disputants as 
more procedurally just for conflict resolution dealing with 
conflicts of interest than the inquisitorial model (LaTour, 
1978; Lind, 1982, Thibaut et al., 1974). 
In summarizing the research on conflict resolution 
methods stemming from Thibaut 
respondents perceive the adversarial 
in resolving conflict than other 
and Walker's model, 
model to 
models 
be more just 
of conflict 
resolution in a variety of studies. This finding has also 
been demonstrated in a cross-cultural study (Lind, 
Erickson, Friedland & Dickenberger, 1978) in four locations: 
(1) United States, (2) England, (3) France and (4) West 
Germany. Thus, is appears that this finding is relatively 
robust. 
Although there is a great deal of research using 
16 
Thibaut and Walker's model of procedural justice, little 
research has included bargaining specifically in the 
analysis. One study that did include bargaining (Thibaut, 
Walker, LaTour & Houlden, 1974) examined several conflict 
resolution methods, characterized by progressively 
increasing degrees of control over the procedure by the 
decision makers. At one end of the continuum was 
bargaining, from which the decision maker has vanished, 
leaving total control over the process in the hands of the 
disputants. At the other end of the continuum was the 
inquisitorial model, in which nearly all of the control over 
the process is allocated to the decision maker (see Figure 
3 ) • 
In this study by Thibaut et al., (1974), respondents 
chose the method of conflict resolution they preferred to 
settle an assault case. Overall, respondents expressed 
greater preference for the adversarial model, viewing it as 
most fair, and expressed least preference for the bargaining 
method, viewing it as least fair. This may be due in part 
to the type of case used 
that may not be seen 
respondents may believe 
in this study, an assault case, 
as negotiable. Alternatively, the 
that the alleged aggressor is 
relatively domineering and competitive and will try to take 
further advantage of the victim during negotiation. 
In sum, Thibaut and Walker's model of procedural 
justice {1975) explores conflict resolution procedures in 
terms of procedural and decision control. 
17 
In a conflict of 
interest, the procedure seen as most fair or just is the 
adversarial method. While it affords the disputants 
procedural control, decision control is delegated to a third 
party. 
Leventhal's Model of Procedural Justice 
A second model of procedural justice expands upon 
Thibaut and Walker's earlier work, by defining the criteria 
that determine perceptions of procedural justice. This 
second model comes from the work of Leventhal (1980), who 
described several important issues in the study of 
procedural justice. First, I will discuss Leventhal's seven 
categories of procedural components. Second, I will discuss 
his six criteria that determine perceptions of procedural 
justice. 
The development of Leventhal's (1980) seven categories 
of procedural components stems from 
individuals first develop internal 
cognitive maps, of the interaction 
his notion that 
representations, or 
settings and social 
systems in which they function. These cognitive maps 
contain structural procedural components 
important features 
resources. 
of the processes 
that correspond to 
of allocation of 
Leventhal described the seven components as: (1) 
selecting of agents; (2) setting ground rules; (3) gathering 
information; (4) building decision structures; (~) making 
18 
appeals; (6) implementing safeguards; and (7) incorporating 
change mechanisms. These components may be present in 
individuals' cognitive maps of any interaction in which 
rewards, punishments or resources are distributed. 
According to Leventhal, after individuals have 
developed cognitive maps of the bargaining situation, they 
then evaluate the fairness of these structural components. 
They do so using rules of fair procedure, or what Leventhal 
defined as the six criteria of importance, which allocative 
procedures must often satisfy to be perceived as fair. His 
criteria are: (1) consistency of persons in behavior and 
over time; (2) suppression of bias (i.e., lack of 
favoritism); (3) accuracy of information; (4) correctability 
of the decision (i.e., ability to appeal; (5) representation 
in decision making body; and (6) maintenance of ethical and 
moral standards. Leventhal's criterion of representation is 
roughly equivalent to Thibaut and Walker's (1975) notion of 
process control. No apparent concept of decision control 
exists, however, in Leventhal's model. 
In some situations, one procedural criterion may be 
considered much more relevant than others, in which case 
judgments of procedural fairness may be dominated by that 
criterion. In other situations, however, several procedural 
criteria may be applicable. 
Research 
has examined 
using Leventhal's (1980) six criteria 
situation variables that determine which 
19 
criteria are important in different situations. 
Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) used Leventhal's criteria in 
studying allocation procedures. They reported that the 
importance of these criteria differs depending on the 
characteristics of the situation: (1) whether it is a task 
or social situation, (2) whether the situation is formal or 
informal, and (3) whether the situation is cooperative or 
competitive. In judging procedural justice, person and time 
consistency, accuracy and ethicality were important for 
cooperative encounters. For 
however, consistency across person 
competitive encounters, 
and accuracy were most 
important in judging procedural justice. 
In sum, Leventhal's (1980) work defines important 
components of procedural justice. Related research 
indicates that these components play an important role in 
the determination of the procedural justice of a conflict 
resolution method. 
OUTCOME EFFECTS ON PERCEIVED PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Another important component in perceptions of 
procedural justice is outcome. Some conflicting results 
exist in the procedural justice literature when the verdict 
or outcome is taken into consideration. For example, Walker 
et al. (1974) and Lind (1980) found that respondents did not 
revise their perceptions of the procedure when they learned 
the verdict. In contrast, however, LaTour (1978) reported 
that perceptions of procedural justice were lower· after an 
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unfavorable verdict or outcome than after a favorable one. 
To date, no explanation 
discrepant results. 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
has been offered for these 
The above two models of procedural justice can be 
applied to bargaining situations to determine the perceived 
procedural justice of different bargaining styles, such as 
cooperation, competition and individualism. The present 
study examined whether people perceive these three styles 
differently, and which criteria of fairness are important 
in determining procedural justice for the three styles. It 
also examined whether negotiators' and representatives' 
perceptions of 
these perceptual 
stems from the 
justice differ. The reason for examining 
differences between client and negotiator 
"actor-observer bias" (Jones & Nisbett, 
1972). As mentioned earlier, the actors' view of their 
behavior emphasizes the causal role of environmental 
conditions at the moment of action. The observers' view, in 
contrast, emphasizes the causal role of stable 
dispositional properties of the actors. 
There is a pervasive tendency, Jones and Nisbett 
argue, for actors to attribute their actions to situational 
demands, whereas observers tend to attribute the same 
actions to stable personal dispositions. Jones and Harris 
(1967) suggest that observers are willing to take behavior 
more or less at "face value", as reflecting a stable 
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disposition, even when it is clear that the actor's behavior 
is being severely restrained by the conditions of the 
interaction. 
This actor-observer bias suggests that in a bargaining 
interaction the negotiator and representative would 
attribute the cause of the bargaining behavior differently. 
Negotiators should attribute their competitive bargaining 
behavior to environmental conditions (e.g., the competitive 
bargaining stance of the other negotiator), Representatives, 
however, should be more likely to view negotiators' behavior 
as a reflection of some stable competitive disposition. 
HYPOTHESES 
Past research suggests four major hypotheses that were 
examined. 
1. It is hypothesized that cooperative bargaining 
behavior will be perceived by participants in a bargaining 
situation to be the most fair procedure, followed by 
individualistic behavior. Competitive bargaining behavior 
will be seen as least fair. Research on cooperative and 
competitive bargaining behavior suggests cooperation 
generates an atmosphere or trust and mutual understanding. 
In the same way, competition generates an atmosphere of 
suspicion and the possibility of exploitation (Crumbaugh & 
Evans, 1967; Rubin & Brown, 1975). Respondents may judge 
negotiations in an atmosphere of trust as more fair than 
negotiations in an atmosphere of suspicion and possible 
22 
exploitation. The individualistic style should fall between 
these two extremes. 
In this study outcome was only partially controlled in 
the experiment. In order to preserve some degree of mundane 
realism in the bargaining interaction, it was necessary to 
leave a degree of outcome control to the participant. Some 
control, however, is necessary in order to separate the (a) 
confound of the tendency for cooperative bargaining to be 
more effective in conflict resolution from (b) the 
perceptions of procedural justice. 
2. Based on the study of Barrett-Howard and Tyler 
(1986), in cooperative negotiation, it is hypothesized that 
participants will perceive person and time consistency, 
accuracy and ethicality as important in the judgement of 
procedural justice. In competitive negotiation, consistency 
across person and accuracy may be seen as more important. 
To date, bargaining research has not defined the criteria 
important for perceptions of procedural justice in 
individualistic bargaining. 
3. Although research is not clear as to the impact of 
outcome on perceptions of procedural justice, it is 
hypothesized that respondents who are satisfied with their 
outcomes will be more likely to judge the procedure as fair 
than those who were dissatisfied with their outcome. A style 
X outcome interaction may also exist. A satisfying outcome 
may be more important to the perceived fairness of a 
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competitive situation than to the perceived fairness of a 
cooperative situation. 
4. It is predicted that the negotiators will 
attribute the cause of their behavior to the situational 
conditions of negotiation, for instance, to the stance of 
the other negotiators (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). Negotiators 
will say they were competitive because the other negotiator 
was competitive. Representatives, on the other hand, will 
view the negotiators' stance as reflecting stable 
dispositions. Representatives will say that negotiators 
were competitive because they are competitive people. 
METHOD 
Design 
The design of this study was a 3 x 2 complete 
factorial. The bi-level independent variable, role, was 
nested within team within group. 
bargaining style conditions 
That is, each of the three 
consisted of four-person 
groups. Each group consisted of two two-person teams, each 
team consisting of a negotiator and representative. 
Subjects 
Participants for this study were one hundred and 
forty-four introductory psychology students from Loyola 
University of Chicago. Participants received course credit 
for participation. As an additional incentive to participate 
and as part of the bargaining manipulation conditions, 
participants also had the opportunity to participate in a 
$30 lottery. The extent of each team's participation in the 
lottery was determined by the plan chosen in the bargaining 
interaction (see below). 
Bargaining Case 
The bargaining case used in this study required two 
negotiators to attempt to reach an agreement on a salary 
package for a restaurant corporation (see Appendix for 
background information). The 
assigned to 2 teams, each randomly 
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subjects were randomly 
assigned to the role of 
negotiator or 
and one team 
attempted to 
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client. One team represented the management, 
represented the union. The negotiators 
agree on a salary plan, choosing between seven 
predetermined plans. Subjects were told that these seven 
plans had been previously defined and discussed by the 
corporation and union executives. 
These seven plans 
representing the degree of 
were assigned 
acceptability of 
point values 
the plans for 
both the union and the management. Participants were 
informed that these point totals had been predetermined by 
the budgeting department to represent the overall 
acceptability of the plan (see Table 1). 
Participants were informed that their participation 
in the experiment allowed them to take part in a cash-prize 
lottery at the end of the data collection. They were told 
that the number of times their team would be entered in the 
lottery was determined by the plan on which they settled 
(see below). 
Measures 
Independent Variables. The three bargaining styles of 
cooperation, competition and individualism were manipulated 
by giving participants in these three conditions different 
information as to their ability to participate in a lottery 
based on their performance in the bargaining situation. 
Participants negotiated a agreement on one of the seven 
salary plans, each solution having different point outcomes. 
Participants were informed 
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differently in the three 
conditions as to how their lottery 
contingent on the settlement. 
participation was 
Bargaining styles were manipulated by the lottery 
participation, which was determined 
(see Appendix). Participants were 
by the selected plan 
told that all teams 
participating in the study could enter the lottery. 
Respondents assigned to the cooperative condition were told 
that their team's plan points would be added to the other 
team's plan points. Each team's lottery participation, or 
the number of times their team was entered in the lottery 
drawing, would be half the total plan points. 
Respondents assigned to the competitive condition were 
told that their team's plan points would be subtracted from 
the other team's plan roints. The number of times each team 
was entered in th~ lottery would be their team's difference. 
Respondents assigned to the individual condition were 
told that their team's plan points would be the amount of 
lottery participation they would receive and that this was 
not contingent on the other team's performance. 
Dependent Variables. Manipulation checks were included 
on the questionnaires to assess the degree to which 
representatives and negotiators felt the bargaining style 
was cooperative, competitive or individualistic (see 
Appendix for actual measures). All items were assessed on 
1 (low) to 7 (high) point scales. 
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Table 1 
SalarY Plans and Schedule of Point Totals for the Two Teams 
Plan 
Total 
Plan 
Plan 
Plan 
Plan 
Plan 
Plan 
Plan 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Management 
Point Total 
50 
10 
30 
45 
25 
35 
40 
Union 
Point Total 
10 
50 
30 
25 
45 
35 
40 
Total 
60 
60 
60 
70 
70 
70 
80 
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Actor-observer questions were included to assess the 
extent to which negotiators and representatives had 
different perceptions of the negotiators' behavior and 
made different causal attributions for the outcome of the 
bargaining interaction. For example, respondents were asked 
to determine the degree to which negotiators' 
competitiveness, negotiators' cooperation, time restraints 
and limited information helped the teams settle on an 
outcome. All items were assessed on a 1 ("helped chances of 
reaching outcome") to 5 ("hurt chances of reaching outcome") 
point scale. 
Distributive justice questions assessed both overall 
perceived fairness of the outcome and also attitudes 
toward different dimensions of the outcome. Outcome 
dimensions included satisfaction with the outcome, perceived 
fairness of the outcome, and ability to control the outcome. 
Questions were modified from Lind et al. 
Appendix for actual measures.) 
Procedural justice questions assessed 
(1980). (See 
the overall 
perceived fairness of the procedure, attitudes toward 
different dimensions of the process (i.e., satisfaction with 
the process, control over the process) and assessment of 
importance of Leventhal's six criteria (i.e., consistency, 
bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, representation, 
and ethics). All but three items were assessed on a 1 (low) 
to 7 (high) point scale. The remaining two items had an 
original scale of 1 (low) to 
section were modified from 
Appendix for actual measures.) 
Procedure 
3 (high). 
Lind, et 
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Questions for this 
al. (1980). (See 
Respondents participated in the study in groups of 
four, consisting of two teams of two people each. 
Respondents were preselected randomly to one of the four 
conditions: union negotiator, union client, management 
negotiator, and management client. Respondents were given a 
general background explanation of the study (see Appendix) 
upon arrival. Twelve groups participated in each bargaining 
style condition. 
After reading the general background information, 
respondents then received the preliminary materials: 
instructions as to the case being negotiated; their part in 
the negotiations; the salary plan indicating their team's 
point values; but not indicating the other team's point 
values, and 
experimenter 
the rules for lottery participation. The 
reviewed the materials briefly with the 
participants to clarify any misunderstandings. 
After reviewing the preliminary materials, respondents 
then separated into the two groups for the 10 - minute 
pre-negotiation 
were asked to 
negotiations. 
discussion, 
outline on 
during 
paper 
which participants 
their strategy for 
After the allotted 10 minutes, participants reconvened 
to negotiate an 
-were told they 
agreement. 
agreement on a salary plan. 
had 20 minutes to attempt 
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Respondents 
to reach an 
After the 20 minutes of negotiation about the salary 
agreement, the plans, or when the group reached an 
respondents reported the outcome of the negotiations, 
indicating what plan they has chosen. Respondents then 
completed the dependent measures described above. After all 
respondents completed the questionnaires, the group was 
debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
Manipulation Check 
Collapsing across 
RESULTS 
the three bargaining style 
conditions, 58% of the teams chose plan G, a plan offering 
forty points to each team. Comparing the three bargaining 
styles, the cooperative bargaining style condition had the 
highest percentage (84%) of teams choosing plan G, whereas 
only 42% of the competitive bargaining style condition and 
50% of the individual bargaining style condition chose plan 
G (see Table 2). 
While 58% of all teams chose plan G, a choice of plan G 
meant different outcomes for each of the three bargaining 
style conditions. Collapsing across conditions, 52% of the 
respondents chose plans that allocated their team forty 
outcome points. The range of point total outcomes that 
teams received was from zero points to forty-five points 
(see Table 3). Three groups, two competitive bargaining 
style groups and one individual bargaining style group, did 
not reach agreement and therefore did not receive an 
outcome. 
To analyze the strength of the bargaining style 
manipulation, two concepts were evaluated: (1) perceived 
cooperation, competition and individualism (assessed via 
three overall items); and (2) time needed to reach a 
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Table 2 
~rcentase 
g_ondi tions 
Plan 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Group N: 
32 
of Plan Choices For All Bargaining Style 
Competitive 
0% 
8% 
0% 
17% 
0% 
17% 
42% 
N=lO 
Condition 
Cooperative Individual 
0% 
8% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
8% 
84% 
N=l2 
0% 
0% 
25% 
8% 
0% 
8% 
50% 
N=ll 
Total 
0% 
6% 
8% 
8% 
0% 
11% 
58% 
N=33 
Three groups, two (17%) in the competitive condition and one 
(8%) in the individualistic condition, reached no agreement 
and therefore received no outcome. 
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Table 3 
~utcome Point Totals for Respondents for each Bargaining 
style Condition 
Number of Respondents in Each Condition 
Competitive 
Condition 
Point Totals 
0 34 
20 4 
25 0 
30 0 
35 0 
40 2 
45 0 
no outcome 8 
Respondent Total: 
48 
Cooperative 
Condition 
0 
0 
0 
4 
4 
40 
0 
0 
48 
Individualistic 
Condition 
0 
0 
2 
12 
4 
24 
2 
4 
48 
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decision. 
Individual 3(bargaining style) X 2(role)1 analyses 
of variance (ANOVAs) were used to determine whether 
differences existed in perceptions of overall cooperation, 
competition and individualism. Results showed no 
significant differences in degree of perceived competition, 
f(3,143) = 0.49, n.s. (see Table 4). 
In terms of perceived cooperation, there was a 
significant main effect of bargaining style, f(2,143) = 
4.06, p =.02. These differences indicated that respondents 
in the competitive bargaining style condition rated 
themselves as less cooperative than did respondents in the 
individual condition, as determined by a Duncan test of 
differences at the p = .05 level (see Table 4). Respondents 
in the cooperative condition saw themselves as neither more 
or less cooperative than the other conditions saw 
themselves. 
There was also a significant main effect of role for 
perceived individualism, f(l,143) = 4.75, = .04. 
Negotiators felt that the other team's possible outcome was 
significantly less important to them (M = 3.65) than it was 
to the representatives (M = 4.22). 
1Although role was a nested variable, Myers, DiCecci, and 
Lorch (1981) suggest that the possible range in alpha based 
on respondent and group sample size does not warrant 
analyzing role as a nested variable. Therefore, in this 
study, role was analyzed as a non-nested variable. 
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Table 4 
Differences of Cooperation, Competition and 
Individualism among Bargaining Style Conditions 
Mean Scores 
Perceived Perceived Perceived 
Competition1 Cooperation2 Individualisma 
Condition and Role 
Competitive (N=48) 4.42 
Negotiator (N=25) 4.44 
Representative (N=23) 4.32 
Cooperative (N=48) 4.83• 
Negotiator (N=25) 4.73 
Representative (N=23) 4.91 
Individualistic (N=48) 4.65 
Negotiator (N=25) 4.73 
Representative (N=23) 4.54 
5.08 
5.20 
4.96 
5.63•b 
5.60 
5.65 
5.88 
5.96 
5.78 
3.79 
3.68 
3.91 
4.lOb 
3.72 
4.52 
3.88 
3.56 
4.22 
1 - No significant difference in perceived competition. 
2 - Main Effect of Condition, E{2,143) = 4.06, p =.02, where 
same letter (•) indicates statistically equal means. 
a - Main Effect of Role, E(l,143) = 4.75, p :,03. 
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a 
In terms of the time required to reach 
one-way ANOVA disclosed a significant 
an agreementt 
effect of main 
bargaining style, E(2,143) = 3.01, R =.05. Further 
examination using a Duncan test showed that the cooperative 
bargaining style condition took significantly less time (M = 
4.75 minutes) to reach an agreement that did the competitive 
condition (M = 7.33 minutes). The individual condition (M = 
6.00 minutes) took neither significantly more nor less time 
than did the other two conditions. 
Procedural Justice 
The measure of perceived 
consisted of the average of two 
overall procedural justice 
items concerning: (1) how 
much the respondent trusted the procedure; and (2) how fair 
the respondent thought the procedure was. 
To determine the relationship between outcome 
satisfaction and procedural justice, a measure of outcome 
satisfaction was developed by averaging across three items: 
(1) how happy the respondent was with the outcome; (2) how 
satisfied the respondent and (3) how satisfied the 
respondent's teammate was with the outcome. 
A 3(bargaining style) X 2(role) multivariate analysis 
of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on 
outcome satisfaction. This MANOVA 
procedural justice and 
indicated that there 
was a significant main effect of bargaining style, E(4,246) 
= 6.66, R <.001. Examination of the univariate main effects 
indicated that the effects for both procedural fairness 
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([(2,124) = 7.11, p =.001) and outcome satisfaction <r<2,124) 
= 10.23, p<.001) were statistically significant. 
In exploring the univariate main effect on perceived 
fairness, further Scheffe tests revealed one significant 
difference among means for the three bargaining styles. 
Specifically, respondents in the competitive bargaining style 
condition considered the procedure significantly less fair 
than did respondents in the individual condition, p =.05 (see 
Table 5). Respondents in the cooperative condition, however, 
did not consider the procedure significantly more fair than 
did those in the competitive group nor less fair than did 
those in the individual group. 
In exploring the univariate main effect of 
satisfaction, further Scheffe tests disclosed two significant 
differences among means for the three bargaining styles. 
Specifically, respondents in the the competitive bargaining 
style condition reported significantly lower outcome 
satisfaction than did respondents in either the cooperative 
or the individual conditions, p's =.05. Respondents in the 
individual and the cooperative conditions reported a 
statistically equivalent level of satisfaction with the 
outcome (see Table 5), 
Because the experimental procedure allowed for groups 
to determine their own outcomes, respondents in different 
bargaining style conditions had the opportunity to attain 
different outcomes (see above). Whereas most of the 
38 
Table 5 
tlean Scores for Bargaining Style on Procedural Justice and 
outcome Satisfaction 
Means for Bargaining Style Condition 
Perceived Perceived 
Competition Cooperation 
Factor 
Procedural Justice! 
4. 01• 4.39•b 
(N:48) (N:47) 
Outcome Satisfaction2 
4. 47c 5.5411 
(N:40) (N:47) 
Correlation of Justice and Satisfaction 
.34 
(N:45) 
R. :.01 
.44 
(N:48) 
R. < .001 
Perceived 
Individualism 
5.02b 
(N=48) 
5.5511 
(N:44) 
.57 
(N=46) 
R. <.001 
1 
- Univariate Main Effect of Bargaining Style for Fairness, 
[(2,124) = 7.11, R. < .001. 
2 - Univariate Main Effect of Bargaining Style for 
Satisfaction, [(2,124) = 10.23, R. < .001. 
a - Same letters within justice effect (a & b) and 
satisfaction effect (c & d) indicate statistically 
equivalent results. 
Note. Sample sizes vary somewhat due to incomplete data for 
some respondents. 
39 
competitive respondents' outcomes were zero points, most of 
the cooperative respondents' outcomes were forty points. In 
order to control for this variance in outcomes, a 
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was done using 
the point totals as a covariate, This MANCOVA indicated that 
the main effect of bargaining style was no longer 
significant, ~(4,244) = 1.96, n.s. Thus, outcome was 
important in determining differences in perceived procedural 
justice between the three bargaining styles. 
Exploring the relationship between perceived procedural 
justice and outcome satisfaction, correlations between these 
two variables were examined. Collapsing across the three 
bargaining styles, a significant positive correlation 
existed between fairness and satisfaction. Furthermore, 
significant positive correlations were found for each of the 
three bargaining styles: competition, cooperation, and 
individualism (see Table 5). 
Procedural Justice Components 
In an attempt to understand the results discussed 
above, Leventhal's procedural justice components were 
explored. 
generated 
style. 
A factor analysis on all dependent variable items 
several meaningful factors for each bargaining 
Kaiser's criterion was used to determine the number 
of factors to retain (i.e., only 
greater than 1.0 were considered.) 
factors with Eigenvalues 
Only loadings above 0.40 
were considered in interpreting and labeling factors. Items 
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that loaded above 0.40 on more than one factor were 
considered to load only on the factor on which they had the 
highest loading. For the cooperative bargaining style, ten 
theoretically meaningful factors with Eigenvalues greater 
than 1.0 emerged. Comparable factor analyses generated nine 
factors with Eigenvalues above 1.0 for the competitive 
bargaining style and eight factors with Eigenvalues above 
1.0 for the individual bargaining style (see Table 6). 
From these factor analyses, six interpretable factors 
were found to overlap across all three bargaining style 
conditions: (1) overall process and outcome satisfaction; 
(2) bias as personal gain; (3) ethics; (4) overall process 
and outcome control; (5) bias as concern in other's outcome; 
and ( 6 ) equal representation in preplanning and 
negotiations. 
For the first five factors (i.e., satisfaction; bias as 
personal gain; ethics; overall control; and bias as concern 
in other's outcome), only identical items across conditions 
were retained for further analyses. Further, reliability 
analyses indicated items to be dropped from each factor in 
order to strengthen the internal consistency, as indicated 
by Cronbach's alpha (see Table 7). 
of variance was accounted for 
(see Table 6). While a scree 
The largest percentage 
by the satisfaction factor 
plot would suggest that 
only one global factor, satisfaction, underlies the responses 
for each bargaining style, meaningful factors with 
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Table 6 
fjl.ctors Generated By Factor Analysis For Each Bargaining 
§__tyle Condi ti on 
Condition 
Cooperation (N=48) 
satisfaction 
bias - outcome mattered 
representation 
ethics 
control - personal 
representation-pre 
bias - opinions 
control - mate's 
personal consistency 
fairness 
Competition (N=48) 
satisfaction 
representation 
control 
accuracy 
ethics 
bias - outcome mattered 
bias - concern 
procedural fairness 
Individualism (N=48) 
satisfaction 
bias 
ethics 
control 
representation 
representation - during 
bias - concern 
bias - outcome mattered 
Eigenvalue % Common 
Variance 
14.73 
4.38 
4.10 
3.25 
2.81 
2.31 
1. 95 
1.62 
1. 53 
1.32 
14.14 
5.43 
3.84 
3.34 
3.10 
2.53 
2.23 
1.82 
10.46 
5.57 
3.96 
3.24 
3.12 
2.48 
1. 98 
1. 73 
25.8 
7.7 
7.2 
5.7 
4.9 
4. 1 
3.4 
2.8 
2.7 
2.3 
24.8 
9.5 
6.7 
5.9 
5.4 
4.4 
3.9 
3.2 
18.4 
9.8 
7.0 
5.7 
5.5 
4.4 
3.5 
3.0 
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Table 7 
cronbach's Alphas for Factors with Identical Items Across 
Barsainins Style Conditions 
Bargaining Style Conditions 
Competitive Cooperative Individual 
Factor 
Satisfaction 
.94 
Bias as Personal Gain 
. 81 
Ethics 
.85 
Control 
.84 
Bias as Concern for Other's Outcome 
.90 
Representation in Preplanning 
.77 
Representation During Negotiations 
.78 
.95 .93 
.96 .93 
.86 .86 
.86 .80 
.92 .83 
.78 .70 
.78 .78 
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mostly identical items across conditions, the representation 
factor consisted of only one item, team's point of view 
expressed in final decision, that was consistent across 
bargaining style conditions. For the cooperative bargaining 
style, two representation factors emerged: (1) represen-
tation during preplanning and (2) representation during 
negotiations. In both the competitive and individual 
bargaining styles, an overall representation factor emerged. 
This factor, however, contained different items for both the 
competitive and individual bargaining styles. 
Following the development of representation in the 
cooperative bargaining condition, two additional factors of 
representation, representation during 
representation during negotiations, 
preplanning and 
were developed. 
Reliability analysis indicated that these representation 
factors had Cronbach alphas of 0.70 or above (see Table 7). 
Using these seven overlapping factors (i.e., 
satisfaction; bias as personal gain; ethics; control; bias 
as concern for other's outcome; representation during 
preplanning; and representation during negotiations), a 
3 (bargaining style) X 2 (role) MANOVA was used to assess 
differences between the factors across the three bargaining 
styles (see Table 8). This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect for bargaining style, f(l4,232) = 2.12, R = .01. 
Univariate main effects of bargaining style were present 
on four of the seven overlapping factors: (1) satisfaction, 
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Table 8 
~ean Differences in Bargaining Style of Seven Factors 
Means for Bargaining Style Conditions 
Competition Cooperation Individualism 
Factor 
Satisfactiona 
4.49 5.40 5.68 
Bias as Personal Gain 
4.40 4.54 4.86 
Ethics 
4.74 5.10 5.38 
Controld 
4.27 4.73 4.93 
Bias as Concern for Other's Outcome 
5.05 4.50 4.81 
Representation During Preplanningb 
5. 11 5.36 5.73 
Representation During Negotiationsc 
4.88 5.33 5.60 
a 
-
Significant univariate main Effect, f.(2,122) = 12.76, 
2. < . 001. 
b 
-
Significant univariate main Effect, E_(2,122) = 3.78, 
2. =.03. 
c 
-
Significant univariate main Effect, E_(2,122) = 6.97, 
2. = .001. 
d - Significant univariate main Effect, f.(2,122) = 3.06, 
2. = .05, although not individually statistically signifi-
cant. 
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;E.(2,122) = 12.76~ p < .001; (2) control, E_(2,122) = 3.06, p 
= .05; (3) representation during preplanning, E_(2,122) = 
3,78, p = .03; and (4) representation during negotiations, 
;E.(2,122) = 6.97, 12. = .001. 
used to further explore each Duncan tests were 
univariate main effect and indicated important bargaining 
style condition differences in mean factor scores. Ratings 
of overall satisfaction were significantly lower for 
respondents in the competitive bargaining style condition 
than for respondents in the cooperative and individual 
bargaining style conditions (p's= .05). The ratings of 
overall satisfaction of respondents in the cooperative and 
individual bargaining styles did not statistically differ. 
For representation during preplannins, ratings of 
equality of representation were significantly lower for 
respondents in the competitive bargaining style condition 
than in either the cooperative or individual bargaining 
style conditions (p's = • 0 5) • Again, ratings for 
respondents in the cooperative and the individual bargaining 
styles did not significantly differ. 
Ratings of equality of representation during the 
negotiations showed a similar pattern. The competitive 
bargaining style perceived significantly less opportunity 
for equal representation than did the individual bargaining 
style. The cooperative bargaining style condition, however, 
indicated neither statistically more equality of representa-
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tion than did the competitive style condition or less 
equality of representation than did the individual style 
condition. 
Although the MANOVA model revealed a main effect of 
bargaining 
univariate 
style for 
bargaining 
the 
style 
control factor, probing 
main effect solely for 
the 
the 
control factor yielded a nonsignificant effect. Therefore, 
no further analysis of bargaining style group differences on 
the control factor was done. 
role, 
The MANOVA also 
E(7,116) = 13.65, 
showed 
I! = 
a significant main effect of 
. 001. Univariate main effect 
analysis indicated statistical significance only on the 
control factor, E(l,122) = 81.80, I! < • 001. Here, as 
anticipated, perceived control was lower among 
representatives than among negotiators. This difference was 
statistically significant for each of the three bargaining 
style groups, as indicated by individual ~ tests (see Table 
9) • 
As discussed earlier, the experimental procedure 
allowed for groups to control their own outcome. Different 
bargaining style conditions could therefore attain different 
outcomes. In order to account for the effect differences in 
point total outcome may have on bargaining style differences, 
point total outcome was 
3(bargaining style) X 
outcome as a covariate, 
used as a covariate in a second 
2(role) MANCOVA. Using point total 
this MANCOVA indicated that the main 
Table 9 
M,_eans for Negotiators and Representatives on Control Factor 
Bargaining Style 
Cooperative 
Competitive 
Individualistic 
Negotiator 
5.71 
5.17 
5.78 
Role 
Representative 
3.56 
3.26 
4.00 
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Note. Mean differences for all bargaining conditions are 
significantly different as indicated by individual i tests, 
I!= .05. 
48 
effect of bargaining style was no longer significant. Thus, 
outcome was important in determining differences between 
bargaining style conditions in perceptions of the importance 
of various procedural justice criteria. 
Using point total outcome as a covariate did not impact 
the significant main effect of role, E(7,115) = 13.56, Q < 
.001. Further analysis indicated a significant univariate 
main effect of bargaining style condition on control, 
E(l,121) = 81.81, R < .001. 
Attribution Bias 
In order to 
and negotiators 
different causes, 
examine the notion that representatives 
would attribute negotiator behavior to 
situation and disposition scales were 
developed from the attributional bias items. A disposition 
scale (Cronbach's alpha = .83) and a situation scale 
(Cronbach's alpha = .52) were theoretically defined in 
the development of the attributional bias assessment (see 
Table 10). 
Disposition scale items included items on the 
negotiator's aggressiveness, cooperation, confidence, skill 
and competitiveness. Situation scale items included items 
assessing the type of situation, the perceived time 
restraint, the limitations of information, the amount of 
preplanning and the other team's strategy. Both the 
disposition and situation scales assessed the degree to 
which respondents perceived these items as having ~ positive 
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Table 10 
R_isposition and Situation Scales 
Factor Loading 
Scale 
Disposition Scale, Cronbach's Alpha:.81 
Item 
1 • Negotiator's aggressiveness .71 
2. Negotiator's cooperation .66 
3 • Negotiator's competitiveness .74 
4. Negotiator's confidence .77 
5. Negotiator's skill . 81 
Situation Scale, Cronbach's Alpha:,52 
Item 
1 • Work spent preplanning .34 
2. Type of situation .77 
3. Time restrictions .65 
4. Other team's strategy .10 
5. Limit of case knowledge .65 
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or negative impact on reaching an outcome. 
A 3(bargaining style) X 2(role) MANOVA was used to 
determine differences between the variables across the three 
bargaining styles. All means were low, indicating that 
respondents generally felt all situation and disposition 
attributes helped their chances of reaching an outcome. The 
MANOVA indicated that there was a significant main effect for 
bargaining style, r(4,274) = 2.49, R = .04. Univariate 
analyses revealed that while there was no main effect for the 
situation scale, ~(2,138) = 1.31, n.s., there was a 
significant univariate main effect for the disposition scale, 
~(2,138) = 5.00, ~ = .01, (Table 11). 
Further probing of this univariate main effect using 
Duncan tests indicated that the competitive bargaining style 
condition rated the negotiator's disposition as much less 
helpful in reaching an outcome than did the cooperative and 
the individual bargaining style conditions. The ratings of 
the cooperative and individual bargaining styles did not 
significantly differ from each other. No significant main 
effect for role was found, E(2,137) = 1.69, n.s, indicating 
that no differences exist in the attribution styles of the 
negotiator and the representative. 
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Table 11 
Bargaining Style Means for the Dispositional Scale and 
Situational Scale 
Scales 
Disposition Scalel 
Situation Scale 
Means for Bargaining Style Conditions 
Competitive Cooperative Individualistic 
2.28• 
(N=48) 
2.79 
(N:48) 
1.83b 
(N=48) 
2.63 
(N=48) 
1.90b 
(N=48) 
2.60 
(N=48) 
i - Univariate Main Effect of bargaining style for disposi-
tion, f(2,138) = 5.00, ~ = .01, where same letters 
indicate equivalent means. 
DISCUSSION 
Procedural Justice 
The major hypothesis of this study was that the 
cooperative bargaining style would be perceived by 
situation to be the most fair 
that respondents in the 
condition found the procedure 
in the competitive condition 
participants in a bargaining 
procedure. Results showed 
individual bargaining style 
most fair, while respondents 
found the procedure least fair. Respondents in the 
cooperative condition considered the procedure neither less 
fair than did respondents in the individual condition nor 
more fair than did respondents in the competitive condition. 
Past research (e.g., Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967; Rubin 
& Brown, 1975) suggests that competitive bargaining behavior 
may generate an atmosphere of suspicion. This lack of trust, 
coupled with the win-lose nature of the interdependent 
outcomes within the competitive bargaining style, may have 
led respondents to feel that the competitive condition was 
unfair. 
While respondents 
the procedure to be 
individual bargaining 
in the competitive condition judged 
least fair, respondents in the 
style judged the procedure to be most 
fair. This may have been due, in part, to differences in 
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the degree of involvement in the experimental procedure 
between the two conditions. While respondents in the 
competitive condition were dependent on the other team for 
their team's outcome, respondents in the individual 
condition were not. Respondents in the individual condition 
may have felt less involved in the bargaining situation. 
This lack of involvement in the individual bargaining 
style condition may have impacted perceptions of procedural 
justice by giving respondents no reason to lower their 
anticipated perceptions of procedural justice. Since this 
study did not assess anticipated perceptions of procedural 
justice, that is perceptions prior participation, this 
hypothesis cannot be tested with the present data. 
Furthermore, the lack of distinction between (a) the 
cooperative style and (b) either the competitive or 
individualistic styles could be due to lack of sensitivity 
in the fairness measure or lack of statistical ability to 
detect a difference (i.e., a Type II error). 
Procedural Justice Components 
While differences existed between the bargaining styles 
in perceived procedural justice, the second hypothesis 
stated that differences would exist between bargaining 
styles in the perceived importance of Leventhal's (1980) 
criteria. Although results did not support predictions made 
in the hypothesis concerning 
criteria (i.e., accuracy and 
specific differences in 
consistency differences), 
results indicated 
Leventhal's criteria. 
differences in several 
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other of 
The criteria of importance in this 
study were overall satisfaction, ethics, overall control and 
equality of representation in both the preplanning and 
negotiation. The competitive group felt less satisfied and 
less equally represented than did the other groups. 
While differences did not exist on the criteria of 
bias (assessed by having respondents indicate how concerned 
they were with aspects of the interaction and outcome), the 
bias criteria in this study was in contrast to the component 
of "suppression of bias," postulated by Leventhal (1980). 
Respondents in this study expressed bias toward their own 
outcome, not a desire to suppress this bias. The difference 
between bias in this study and Leventhal's "bias 
suppression" may be a function of the operationalization of 
bias. The measure of bias used in this study may not have 
allowed respondents to express a desire to suppress this 
bias during the negotiations. Further research should 
elaborate the construct of bias in terms of concern both for 
other's and self gain and in terms of the importance of 
preventing the expression of this bias. 
The Relationship between Procedural Justice and Outcome 
Consistent with the second hypothesis, these results 
indicated differences between bargaining styles on several 
of Leventhal's (1980) procedural justice criteria. It was 
further hypothesized that respondents who were satisfied 
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with their outcomes would be more likely to judge the 
procedure as fairer than those who were dissatisfied with 
their outcomes. Results provided support for this 
hypothesis in revealing a strong positive correlation 
between perceptions of procedural justice and outcome 
satisfaction. This relationship was found for all three 
bargaining styles. However, since outcome was not directly 
manipulated, the causal nature of this association cannot be 
determined from the present results. 
Attribution Bias 
Finally, it was hypothesized, based on the work of 
Jones and Nisbett (1972), that negotiators would attribute 
the causes of their own behavior to dispositional factors 
whereas the representatives would attribute the causes of 
the negotiator's behavior to situational factors. Results 
indicated no support for this hypotheses, finding no 
differences in the attributional styles of negotiators and 
representatives. This lack of support may be because both 
the negotiator and representative felt comparably involved 
in the negotiations, making the representative less of a 
true ''observer" and more of an active participant. However, 
representatives did report feeling less control over the 
situation, so the roles were not perceived to be exactly the 
same. 
Implications 
These results have two important implications. The 
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first implication is the 
perceptions of procedural 
importance 
justice. 
of outcome in 
Although results 
indicated support for several of the hypotheses of 
differences in perceptions 
was a dominating factor 
of procedural justice, outcome 
throughout the study. When point 
as a covariate, main effects of total outcome was used 
bargaining style vanished. This dominance of outcome makes 
intuitive sense when considering the nature of outcome 
control in the bargaining procedure. Bargaining, as a 
procedure, allows disputants total control of the outcome, 
unlike a legal procedure where outcome control is in the 
hands of the third-party decision maker. Therefore, it may 
be that in procedures where outcome control is in the hands 
of the disputants, outcome becomes a very important 
component in perceptions of procedural justice. 
The second implication of the present study is the 
importance of cooperation as a bargaining style. These 
results suggest negotiations that are competitive will be 
less satisfying and seen as less fair by the participants 
than other styles of negotiations. This is yet another 
reason to encourage cooperative or individualistic 
bargaining between groups or people in conflict. 
If cooperative (or individualistic) bargaining styles 
are perceived as more satisfying and more fair, and as 
earlier research has suggested, lead to more effective 
bargaining by satisfactorily resolving conflict (Crumbaugh 
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& Evans, 1967; Keenan & Carnevale, 1989; Rubin & Brown, 
1975), further research should explore the possibilities of 
training disputants to bargain cooperatively. Cooperative 
bargaining can be encouraged by skills training with parties 
in conflict to inform them of the advantages of cooperative 
bargaining. Key elements of perceived procedural justice 
important to parties in conflict, such as equal 
representation in all elements of the negotiation process, 
their own and the other party's potential outcomes, and 
achieving satisfaction in both the process and outcome, 
can be addressed in training parties to resolve conflict. 
With these implications in mind, further research needs 
to explore perceptions of fairness in a variety of 
bargaining situations in order to expand the external 
validity of these results. Because conflict is an 
inevitable part of our daily lives, further research in 
perceptions of procedural justice in bargaining situations 
will help us both understand and promote effective and 
satisfying conflict resolution. 
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APPENDIX 
Negotiation Case 
Riley's Restaurant Company 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Management Negotiator 
From: Budgeting Department 
Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Union 
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Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the management are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Management 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Management Acceptability 
50 points 
10 
30 
45 
25 
35 
40 
Negotiation Case 
Riley's Restaurant Company 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Management Representative 
From: Budgeting Department 
Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Union 
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Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the management are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Management 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Management Acceptability 
50 points 
10 
30 
45 
25 
35 
40 
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MANAGEMENT PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO MANAGEMENT 
PLAN A: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (45 points) This plan 
increase and a 2.5% increase 
offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
UNION PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO UNION TEAM 
PLAN A: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (25 points) This plan 
increase and a 2.5% increase 
offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 year. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
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POINT PLAN 
Team lottery participation will be determined by taking 
your team's point total and subtracting the other team's 
total to give a final point total for the team. 
Example 1: 
points for union team = 40 
points for management team = 10 
union team: 
40 - 10 = 30 points for union team 
management team: 
10 - 40 = -30 which is 0 points for management team 
Example 2: 
points for management team = 35 
points for union team = 25 
management team: 
35 - 25 = 10 points for management team 
union team: 
25 - 35 = -10 which is 0 points for union team 
Example 3: 
no decision--
union and management team points = 0 
no lottery participation 
Negotiation Case 
Restaurant Union 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Union Negotiator 
From: Restaurant Union Budgeting Department 
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Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Management 
Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the union are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Union 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Union Acceptability 
10 points 
50 
30 
25 
45 
35 
40 
Negotiation Case 
Restaurant Union 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Union Representative 
From: Restaurant Union Budgeting Department 
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Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Management 
Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the union are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Union 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Union Acceptability 
10 points 
50 
30 
25 
45 
35 
40 
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MANAGEMENT PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO MANAGEMENT 
PLAN A: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
UNION PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO UNION TEAM 
PLAN A: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 year. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
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POINT PLAN 
Team lottery participation will be determined by taking 
your team's point total and subtracting the other team's 
total to give a final point total for the team. 
Example 1: 
points for union team = 40 
points for management team = 10 
union team: 
40 - 10 = 30 points for union team 
management team: 
10 - 40 = -30 which is 0 points for management team 
Example 2: 
points for management team = 35 
points for union team = 25 
management team: 
35 - 25 = 10 points for management team 
union team: 
25 - 35 = -10 which is 0 points for union team 
Example 3: 
no decision--
union and management team points = 0 
no lottery participation 
Negotiation Case 
Riley's Restaurant Company 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Management Negotiator 
From: Budgeting Department 
Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Union 
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Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the management are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Management 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Management Acceptability 
50 points 
10 
30 
45 
25 
35 
40 
Negotiation Case 
Riley's Restaurant Company 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Management Representative 
From: Budgeting Department 
Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Union 
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Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the management are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Management 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Management Acceptability 
50 points 
10 
30 
45 
25 
35 
40 
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MANAGEMENT PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO MANAGEMENT 
PLAN A: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
UNION PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO UNION TEAM 
PLAN A: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years~ 
PLAN E: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 year. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
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POINT PLAN 
Team lottery participation determined by adding both team's 
points together then dividing by 2. 
Example 1: 
points for union team = 30 
points for management team = 30 
total points = 60 
divide by 2 = 30 
TEAM TOTAL : 30 points 
Example 2: 
points for union team = 30 
points for management team = 10 
total points = 40 
divide by 2 = 20 
TEAM TOTAL = 20 points 
Example 3: 
no decision--
union and management team points = 0 
no lottery participation 
Negotiation Case 
Restaurant Union 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Union Negotiator 
From: Restaurant Union Budgeting Department 
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Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Management 
Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the union are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Union 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Union Acceptability 
10 points 
50 
30 
25 
45 
35 
40 
Negotiation Case 
Restaurant Union 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Union Representative 
From: Restaurant Union Budgeting Department 
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Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Management 
Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the union are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Union 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Union Acceptability 
10 points 
50 
30 
25 
45 
35 
40 
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MANAGEMENT PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO MANAGEMENT 
PLAN A: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
UNION PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO UNION TEAM 
PLAN A: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 year. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
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POINT PLAN 
Team lottery participation determined by adding both team's 
points together then dividing by 2. 
Example 1: 
points for union team = 30 
points for management team = 30 
total points = 60 
divide by 2 = 30 
TEAM TOTAL = 30 points 
Example 2: 
points for union team = 30 
points for management team = 10 
total points = 40 
divide by 2 = 20 
TEAM TOTAL : 20 points 
Example 3: 
no decision--
union and management team points = 0 
no lottery participation 
Negotiation Case 
Riley's Restaurant Company 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Management Negotiator 
From: Budgeting Department 
Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Union 
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Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the management are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Management 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Management Acceptability 
50 points 
10 
30 
45 
25 
35 
40 
Negotiation Case 
Riley's Restaurant Company 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Management Representative 
From: Budgeting Department 
Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Union 
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Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the management are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Management 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Management Acceptability 
50 points 
10 
30 
45 
25 
35 
40 
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MANAGEMENT PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO MANAGEMENT 
PLAN A: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
UNION PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO UNION TEAM 
PLAN A: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 year. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
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POINT PLAN 
Team lottery participation will 
your team's point total as the 
team. 
be determined by taking 
final point total for the 
Example 1: 
points for union team = 40 
points for management team = 10 
union team: 
40 points for union team 
management team: 
10 points for management team 
Example 2: 
points for management team = 35 
points for union team = 25 
management team: 
35 points for management team 
union team: 
25 points for union team 
Example 3: 
no decision--
union and management team points = 0 
no lottery participation 
Negotiation Case 
Restaurant Union 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Union Negotiator 
From: Restaurant Union Budgeting Department 
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Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Management 
Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the union are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Union 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Union Acceptability 
10 points 
50 
30 
25 
45 
35 
40 
Negotiation Case 
Restaurant Union 
Salary Negotiations 
To: Riley's Restaurant Union Representative 
From: Restaurant Union Budgeting Department 
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Re: Current Salary Negotiations with Restaurant Management 
Our department has outlined below the acceptability of the 
seven salary plans defined and discussed at the recent 
management-union executive meeting. These seven plans and 
the point values to indicate the acceptability of each plan 
to the union are represented below. 
Salary Plans and Schedule of 
Point Totals Indicating 
Acceptability to Union 
Plan 
Plan A 
Plan B 
Plan C 
Plan D 
Plan E 
Plan F 
Plan G 
Union Acceptability 
10 points 
50 
30 
25 
45 
35 
40 
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MANAGEMENT PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO MANAGEMENT 
PLAN A: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
UNION PLANS - INFORMATION GIVEN ONLY TO UNION TEAM 
PLAN A: (10 points) This plan offers the workers a 1% salary 
increase and a 1% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN B: (50 points) This plan offers the workers a 5% salary 
increase and a 5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN C: (30 points) This plan offers the workers a 3% salary 
increase and a 3% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN D: (25 points) This plan offers the workers a 2.5% salary 
increase and a 2.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN E: (45 points) This plan offers the workers a 4.5% salary 
increase and a 4.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 year. 
PLAN F: (35 points) This plan offers the workers a 3.5% salary 
increase and a 3.5% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
PLAN G: (40 points) This plan offers the workers a 4% salary 
increase and a 4% increase in benefits over the next 3 years. 
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POINT PLAN 
Team lottery participation 
your team's point total as 
team. 
will be determined by taking 
the final point total for the 
Example 1: 
points for union team = 40 
points for management team = 10 
union team: 
40 points for union team 
management team: 
10 points for management team 
Example 2: 
points for management team = 35 
points for union team = 25 
management team: 
35 points for management team 
union team: 
25 points for union team 
Example 3: 
no decision--
union and management team points = 0 
no lottery participation 
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RESPONDENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Below are a few general questions about the negotiations in 
which you have just participated. Please read and answer 
all questions. 
1) On what team were you? 
~~~management team ___ union team 
2) What topic did you have for negotiations? 
teacher/school board relations 
___ restaurant company/union negotiations 
3) On which plan did you agree? 
___ plan A 
---"plan D 
plan G 
---
--~plan B 
--"""plan E 
___ plan C 
---"plan F 
4) How many points was that plan worth to your team? 
~--------~-oints 
5) Prior to beginning the study, how well would you say you 
knew the person who was your teammate? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not at all very well 
6) Prior to beginning the study, how well would you say you 
knew the person who participated as the negotiator for the 
other team? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not at all very well 
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7) Prior to beginning the study, how well would you say you 
knew the person who participated as the client for the other 
team? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not at all very well 
8) During the negotiations, how important was it to you that 
the 
opposing team get a good outcome? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
very unimportant very important 
9) During the negotiations, how important was it to you to 
get a better outcome than the other team? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
very unimportant very important 
10) During the negotiation, how important to you was the 
other team's possible outcome? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
very unimportant very important 
11) To what degree do you feel both teams cooperated with 
each other during the negotiation process? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
did not cooperate did cooperate 
12) To what degree do you feel both teams competed with each· 
other during the negotiation process? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
did not compete did compete 
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Negotiation Preplanning 
Below are several questions concerning 
process you have just participated in. 
answer each question carefully. 
the preplanning 
Please read and 
1) Do you think you and your teammate participated equally 
in the negotiation preplanning? (please check only one) 
I participated somewhat more than my teammate 
participation was equal 
my teammate participated somewhat more than I 
2) Did the negotiation preplanning favor either you or your 
teammates point of view? 
preplanning favored my point of view 
preplanning did not favor either 
preplanning favored my teammate's point of 
view 
3) During the preplanning, how concerned do you think you 
were with the outcome you personally would get? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
very unconcerned very concerned 
4) During the preplanning, how concerned do you think your 
teammate was with the outcome he/she would get? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
very unconcerned 
5) How much of 
to formulate a 
bargaining case? 
the information 
strategy was 
very concerned 
you and your teammate used 
based on the facts of the 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
very little 
information 
great deal of 
information 
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6) How similar do you think your negotiations with the other 
team were with the the preplanning strategy? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
negotiations 
different from 
preplanning 
negotiations 
similar to 
preplanning 
7) Did the strategy you and your teammate developed reflect 
your point of view? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
did not reflect did reflect 
my point of view my point of view 
8) Did the strategy you and your teammate developed reflect 
your teammate's point of view? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
did not reflect did reflect 
teammate's point teammate's point 
of view of view 
9) How easily do you feel you were able to express your 
point of view during the preplanning? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very easily very easily 
10) How easily do you feel your teammate was able to express 
his/her point of view during the preplanning? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very easily very easily 
11) How ethical do you think your preplanning strategy was? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very ethical very ethical 
89 
Below are questions about the negotiation process in which 
you just participated. Please read and answer all items 
carefully. 
1) How well did you (or your negotiator) present your case 
to the opposing side? 
1 2 3 
not very well 
4 5 6 7 
very well 
2) How much effort did your teammate put into developing a 
negotiation strategy during negotiation preplanning? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little effort great deal of effort 
3) How much effort did you put into developing a negotiation 
strategy during negotiation preplanning? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little effort great deal of effort 
4) How satisfied are you that your team's point of view was 
presented during the negotiations? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very satisfied very satisfied 
5) To what extent were you able to control what happened in 
the negotiations? 
1 2 3 4 
little control 
5 6 7 
great deal of 
control 
6) How much opportunity did each side have to present its 
point of view during the negotiations? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little opportunity much opportunity 
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7) How much do you think your teammate wanted 
side to win? 
the other 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
wanted other side did not want other 
to win side to win 
8) How much do you think you wanted your opponent to win? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
wanted other side did not want other 
to win side to win 
9) How much do you think your teammate wanted your side to 
win? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
wanted your side did not want your 
to win side to win 
10) How much did you want to win? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very much great deal 
11 ) How much did the negotiations favor your team? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very much great deal 
12) How much did the negotiations favor your opponent? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very much great deal 
13) How satisfied are you with the negotiation procedure? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very satisfied satisfied a great 
deal 
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14) How much would you trust this negotiation procedure in 
settling future disputes? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
would not trust would trust 
15) How fair do you think the negotiation procedure was? 
1 2 3 
not very fair 
4 5 6 7 
very fair 
Below are a few questions regarding the outcome of the 
negotiations-- the settlement that was reached. Please read 
and answer carefully all of the questions. 
1) Do you think the outcome of your negotiation is unbiased, 
meaning that it does not favor either side? 
1 2 3 
biased-favors one side 
more than other 
4 5 
2) Do you accept the outcome of 
accurate reflection of both teams' 
1 2 3 
inaccurately reflects 
points of view 
3 ) How happy did you 
1 2 3 
not very happy 
4 5 
feel when the 
4 5 
6 7 
unbiased-favors neither 
side 
the negotiation 
points of view? 
6 7 
as an 
accurately reflects 
points of view 
outcome was reached? 
6 7 
very happy 
4) How satisfied was your teammate with the outcome? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very satisfied very satisfied 
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5) How satisfied were you with the outcome? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very satisfied very satisfied 
6) How much involvement did you have in deciding on the 
final outcome? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little involvement much involvement 
7) How much involvement did your teammate have in deciding 
on the final outcome? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
little involvement much involvement 
8) How responsible was your teammate for your outcome? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very responsible very responsible 
9) How responsible were you for the outcome? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very responsible very responsible 
10) How satisfied are you with the negotiations? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very satisfied very satisfied 
1 1 ) How fair do you think the outcome was? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not very fair very fair 
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Negotiation Questionnaire 
Below are several questions 
process you just participated 
each question. 
concerning the 
in. Please read 
negotiation 
and answer 
1) Do you think your team and the other team were able to 
participate equally in the negotiations? (please check 
one) 
my team participated more than the other team 
both teams participated equally 
the other team participated more than my team 
2) How consistent was your team's style of reponding to the 
other team during negotiations? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very consistent consistent 
3) How concerned do you think your team was about your own 
possible outcome during the negotiations? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very concerned very concerned 
4) How concerned do you think the other team was about their 
own possible outcome during the negotiations? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very concerned very concerned 
5) How accurate do you think the information was that your 
team presented during negotiations? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very accurate very accurate 
6) How accurate do you think the information was that the 
other team presented during negotiations? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very accurate very accurate 
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7) How much do you think your team's interests were 
considered during the negotiation process? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very much very much 
8) How much do you think the other team's interests were 
considered during the negotiation process? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very much very much 
9) How ethical do you think the negotiation process you just 
participate in was in settling this case? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very ethical very ethical 
10) How consistent is the settlement you reached with the 
preplanning expected settlement? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very consistent very consistent 
11) Was the final decision was consistent with the way the 
negotiations were going up to that point? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very consistent very consistent 
12) When the final decision was made, how much did you think 
about what you personally would gain from the decision? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very much very much 
13) When the final decision was made, how much do you think 
your teammate thought about what he/she personally would 
gain from the decision? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very much very much 
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14) When the final decision was made, how much do you think 
the other team members were thinking about what they would 
gain from the decision? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very much very much 
15) How accurate do you think the information was that was 
considered by both sides in making the final decision? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very accurate very accurate 
16) How easily do you think it would have been to change the 
final decision once it was made, before you reported it to 
the experimenter? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very easily very easily 
17) In making the final decision, do you feel your team's 
point of view was considered? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not really considered really considered 
18) In making the final decision, do you feel the other 
team's point of view was considered? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not really considered really considered 
19) How ethical do you consider the final decision to be? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very ethical very ethical 
20) How ethical do you think both your team and the other 
team were in making the final decision? 
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7 
not very ethical very ethical 
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Below is a list of things that may have had an impact on 
your outcome. Please rate what type of impact these things 
had on reaching the outcome. An item has a positive impact 
when it helped your chances of reaching an outcome. An item 
has a negative impact when it hurt your chances of reaching 
an outcome. Please rate all items below using the following 
scale. 
1--very positive impact on reaching outcome 
2--somewhat positive impact on reaching outcome 
3--no impact on reaching outcome 
4--somewhat negative impact on reaching outcome 
5--very negative impact on reaching outcome 
WHAT TYPE OF IMPACT DID THE FOLLOWING ITEMS HAVE: 
l) __ your negotiator's aggressiveness during 
negotiations 
2) __ the amount of work spent on negotiation preplanning 
3) __ your negotiator's ability to cooperate with the 
other team 
4) __ the type of situation that was being negotiated 
5) __ your negotiator's ability to compete with the other 
team 
6) __ the time restrictions of the negotiations 
7) __ your negotiator's confidence during ne1eotiations 
8) __ the other team's ne&Cotiation strategy 
9) __ your negotiator's skill in responding to the other 
team's suggestions 
10) __ the limit of knowled&Ce that was available about the 
case 
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